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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR - MASTER AND SERVANT
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE - NEGLIGENCE

-

"A master's liability for the torts of his servant rests upon no well-defined
legal principle." Huffcut on Agency, 2nd ed., sec. 149. See also Mechem on
Agency, sec. 1856 and 1857. "To visit a man with heavy damages for the negligence of a servant, when he is able to show that he exercised all possible care
and precaution in the selection of him, is apt to strike the common mind as unjust." Hays vs. Miller, 77 Pa. 238 (1874).
Because the basis for this liability is, at best, vague, and also because of its
repugnance to the concepts of justice entertained by "the common mind", the
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior has been limited, since its inception, to cases in which:
1. the master-servant relationship existed, and
2. the servant, at the time of the commission of the tort, was
about his master's business, and
3. the servant was acting within the scope of his employment.
Huffcut on Agency, sec. 242.
Substantially the same requisites were expressed in Luckett vs. Reighard, 248 Pa.
24 (1915) where the court said that the plaintiff must prove "that the relationship of master and servant existed at the time of the accident, that the servant
was engaged in his master's business and was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the tortious act was committed."
It is surprising, therefore, that twice in the last fifteen years our Supreme
Court, in applying the doctrine, has overlooked the fundamental distinction between the principal-agent relationship and that of master-servant. The latest
example of the court's failure to make this distinction is the case of Gozdonovic
vs. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23 (1947). The defendant real estate
company, whose office was in Pittsburgh, had employed one Kartub, who lived
in McKeesport, as a salesman for lots in a development in Pleasant Hills, some
eight miles south of Pittsburgh. Kartub was employed on a commission basis,
and all of the expenses incident to using his automobile in his work were paid
by himself.
One day Kartub drove his car from his home to the defendant's office to
obtain some "leads", intending to proceed later to the home of some prospective
purchasers in a nearby town. While at the office, he discovered that he had for.
gotten to bring with him from his home cards containing data concerning these
prospects. He returned to his home, intending to stop only long enough to get
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the cards. He parked his car on a very steep grade, left the gears in neutral,
neglected to turn the wheels in toward the curb, and probably failed properly
to set the emergency brake. After he locked the door, the car started down the
hill, crashing at its foot into a laundry truck, and injuring the driver, the plaintiff
in the action.
Plaintiff had verdict and judgment, and the defendant appealed from the
court's refusal to enter judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial.
In affirming the judgment of the lower court, the court, in an opinion by
Horace Stern, J., cited a long line of cases concerned with the question of an
employer's liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned and
maintained by an employee and used by him in furtherance of his employer's
business. It quoted the opinion of Justice Maxey in Wesolowski vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 308 Pa. 117 (1932): "To hold a master legally
responsible for the act of a servant who is engaged in furthering his master's business and who while doing so negligently uses some instrumentality that carries
him from place to place, it must either be proved that the master exercises actual
or potential control over that instrumentality, or the use of the instrumentality at the time and place of the act complained of must be of such vital importance
in furthering the business of the master that the latter's actual or potential control of it at that time and place may reasonably be inferred." The court then
quotes from Gittleman vs. Hoover, 337 Pa. 242 (1940): "Unless the employe is
directed by the employer to use his car for the purpose of traveling from place
to place, or unless the circumstances are such that it is reasonably necessary for
him so to travel

.

. . . ,

the employer is not liable for injuries occasioned thereby

to third persons." From the quotations from these two cases, both of which, it
should be noted, denied the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the court draws its positive rule governing the instant case: "The obvious import
of the rule as thus stated - the test of 'vital importance' or 'reasonable necessity'
- is that, if an employe uses his automobile in furtherance of his employer's business but primarily for his own convenience, such use therefore being a matter
of indifference to the employer, the latter is not legally responsible for the operation of the car ....; on the other hand, an employer cannot evade liability -

if

the automobile is a necessary instrumentality for the effective conduct of his business - merely because it is the employe who himself owns, maintains, and operates the vehicle." (Italics in three quotations supplied.)
That the terms "servant" and "employe" are not properly convertible is
recognized by all authorities on agency. That eminent Writer on the subject, Prof.
Ernest W. Huffcut, deemed the distinction to be of such paramount importance
as to say, "The law of agency is divided into the law of principal and agent and
the law of master and servant." op. Cit. supra sec. 8. He accordingly separated
his text into two books, treating the incidents of each separately. In sec. 2, he
defines an agent as a representative a'uthorizi'd "to represert he 'Will of tht Con-
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stituent to third persons with a view to establish new legal relations between such
persons and the constituent by creating voluntary primary obligations", and a
servant as one authorized "to perform for the constituent operative or mechanical
duties not intended to create any new legal relations between him and third persons." Later authorities have not carried the distinction so far, but none have
failed to observe it in discussions of the doctrine under consideration. The Restatement of the Law of Agency treats a servant as a species of agent, but distinguishes between a servant - "whose physical conduct in the performance of
the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master", and
an independent contractor - "who is not controlled by the other nor subject to
the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance
of the undertaking." The distinction, it says, is important only in the determination of the liability of an employer for the tort of his employe. As to this situation, however, it makes it clear that a principal is not liable for physical harm
caused by the negligent physical conduct of an agent who is not a servant, during
the performance of the principal's business, except in certain specified instances
not material to the present discussion. The Restatement of the Law of Agency,
secs. 2 and 250 and comments,
It is obvious that Kartub could not be classified as a servant of the defendant
under either of the above definitions. The realty company could have had little
concern in the manner in which he operated his car. His employment was to sell
lots of land. His compensation was a commission on the price paid for each lot
sold, and was in no way affected by the use he made of his automobile; indeed,
he was not even reimbursed for the necessary expenses of its operation. Even
if it is assumed that under the Restatement definition Kartub could qualify as a
servant of the defendant as to his negotiations with prospective purchasers, the
indispensable element of control is totally lacking as to his operation of his automobile. The Restatement in sec. 239, comment b, is quoted with approval and
made the basis of the decision in Holdsworth vs. Pennsylvania Power and Light
Co., 337 Pa. 235 (1940), where it is said: "The master may authorize the use
of the instrumentality without assuming control over its use as a master. The
fact that he does not own it or has not rented it upon such terms that he can
direct the manner in which it may be used indicates that the servant is to have a
free hand in its use. If so, its control by the servant, although upon his master's
business, is not within the scope of the employment."
But the court in the Gozdonovic case does not pretend to rest the liability of
the defendant upon the existence of a master-servant relationship. It is satisfied
with the facts that defendant was the employer of Kartub and that the car was a
necessary instrumentality for the effective conduct of the employer's business.
Why did the court fail to make the distinction? Why did the Wesolowski case,
cited by Justice Stern, use the terms "master" and "servant", while the Gittleman
case used the terms "employer" and "employe"? Certainly the cue was not re-
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ceived from the authoritative writers on the subject. Nor can it be found in the
cases of other jurisdictions, for none are cited. Changing public policy cannot
be the answer or it certainly would have been indicated by the court. The remaining alternative is that the distinction was passed over in some earlier Pennsylvania case - and such is the fact.
The first two cases in the long line cited by the court are the Wesolowski
case and Loper vs. P. G. Publishing Co., 312 Pa. 580 (1933). Both cases turned
on the adequacy of the statements of claim. In the Wesolowski case, the relevant
portion averred: "The said servant, agent, or employee of the defendant, at the
time of the occurrence hereinafter more fully set forth, was operating said automobile in and about the course of his duties as a servant, agent or employee of
the defendant." Judgment n.o.v. was entered and affirmed by the Supreme Court
on the ground that sufficient facts had not been averred and proved to invoke the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The gist of the opinion is found in the portion
quoted by the court in the Gozdonovic case.
In the Loper case the statement of claim averred: "At the same time, one
B. H. Bentley, an agent and employe of the defendant ... ,was driving an automobile . . . upon the business of said defendant . . . and within the scope of his
. . . authority and employment."
(Italics supplied) No affidavit of defense
was filed. The averments were offered and admitted in evidence at the trial
without objection. Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff and defendant
appealed, relying on the Wesolowski case. Justice Simpson, in his opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court, literally laid the averments in the two
cases side by side and made an almost hair-splitting distinction between them.
Assuming that there was justification for the distinction, it remains that the
court in this case approved the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior
on nothing more than the existence of a principal-agent, or employer-employe relationship, for that is the only one alleged to exist.
The Gittleman case, properly disallowing the doctrine on other grounds, followed the language of the Loper case, thus more firmly establishing in this class
of cases the substitution of employment for the master-servant relationship. The
Gozdonovic case, by basing its decision on the Gittleman case, thus ratified the
deviation from settled law in the Loper case. It is submitted that such a fundamental change in the already anomalous doctrine of respondeat superior should
be based on something more substantial than is evident in the cases and should
be permitted to continue only after a thorough reconsideration by the court.
DANIEL KNITTLE
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CONCEALED EASEMENT - PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT - PERMISSIVE
USE - LOST GRANT - PRESUMPTIONS ARISING
This note considers the rights of disputing parties in relation to a concealed
easement of unknown origin in continuous use more than twenty-one years concerning which the present servient tenement has had no notice.
The problem arose in the case of Cohn et al, Trustees vs. Williams before
J. Colvin Wright, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford
County, in the May term, 1947; and is not believed to have been the subject
of previous adjudication. The writer in his preparation has been privileged to
utilize the briefs of Richard C. Snyder, Counsel for Defense, and the opinion of
Judge Wright.
Briefly the facts are these:B, excavating on his own land in order to erect a building, unknowingly
severs a sewer line; plugs it up in order to prevent sewage pollution on his property with the result that the sewage backs up in A's cellar whose property joins
that of B across a private alley. A brings a Bill in Equity to have B ordered to
restore the sewer line, claiming an easement by prescription or user for more than
twenty-one years.
B defends on the ground that (1) he had no prior knowledge of the sewer
connection; (2) there is no easement indicated on record title; (3) it was not
apparent on the premises.
The Court found as fact among others that: (1) the sewer line existed underground for more than twenty-one years; (2) there is no evidence in the chain of
title to the defendant's land of the burden of any easement, restriction, or servitude; (3) the sewer line was not an apparent easement; (4) the sewer line was
constructed because of a relationship between the prior owners of the adjacent
properties; (5) the defendants had no notice of the easement prior to the excavation.
In alleging a claim of easement on the land of another by virtue of prescription or adverse user for twenty-one years, the burden of proof is 'always on the
party, so claiming, to show the existence of facts making up such possession:
Tremont vs. Ford, 91 P. L. J. 192; Hood vs. Hood, 25 Pa. 417; Fisher vs. Hunsberger, 148 Pa. Super. 481; Ontelaunce Orchardsvs. Rothermel, 139 Pa. Super. 44.
The claimants must prove that they, and those under whom they claim, entered under a claim of right and have had actual adverse, continuous, visible,
notorious, distinct possession for twenty-one years. ohons vs. Johns, 244 Pa. 48;
Tremont vs. Ford, supra.
To prove a continuous use is not sufficient; to prove a continuous adverse
use is not sufficient; to prove any'one or more of the elements of adverse posses-
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sion isnot enough; the claimant must prove all the elements, i.e. - a use continuous, adverse, apparent, and notorious for twenty-one years - to establish his
case.
The Restatement of Property Vol. 5, Sec. 457, states, "An easement is created by such use of land, for the period of prescription, as would be privileged
if an easement existed, provided the use is
(a)
(b)

adverse, and
for the period of prescription, continuous and uninterrupted."

Sec. 458, states, "A use of land is adverse to the owner of an interest in land
which is or ma , become possessory when it is
not made in subordination to him, and
(a)
wrongful, or may be made by him wrongful, as to him,
(b)
and
(c) open and notorious."
In the face of a finding of fact by the Court that an alleged easement was
created because of the relationship between the prior owners of the adjacent
properties, a presumption of permissive use arises, and the servient tenement
has the right to terminate said use at will. Restatement of Property, Vol. 5,
Sec. 458 (j), commenting upon special relationship of the party to an open and
notorious use says: "Where a user of land and one having an interest affected
by the use have a relationship to each other sufficient in itself to justify the use,
the use is not adverse unless knowledge of its adverse character is had by the one
whose interest is affected. The responsibility of bringing this knowledge to him
lies upon the one making the use. It is not open to a user of land to contend
as against one to whom he stands in a relationship sufficient to justify the use
that, because the one to whom he stands in this relationship had a reasonable op.
portunity to learn of the existence of the use and of its nature, the use was as
to him open and notorious and therefore adverse. Thus, a licensee cannot begin
an adverse use against his licensor merely by repudiating, his license under such
circumstances that the licensor has a reasonable opportunity to learn of the repudiation."
Furthermore, a privilege to use land in the possession of another is a license
if, though the use privileged is of such a character that the privilege to make it
could be created as an easement, it is created to endure at the will of the possessor
of the land subject to the privilege. Restatement of Property, Vol. 5, Sec. 514.
Moreover, such permissive use must be presumed to have continued as such
in absence of testimony to the contrary that subsequent transfers resulted in a
severance of the permissive use and created a use hostile to the servient tenement.
PhiladelphiaSteel Abrasion Co. vs. L. J. Gediche Sons, 343 Pa. 524; Deb vs.
Ferris, 150 Pa. Super. 274; Robertson vs. Wheeler, 28 Luz. 431.
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In Bennet vs. Biddle, 140 Pa. 396, Mr. Justice Williams held that mere
possession will not give title, under the Statute of Limitations, to a right-of-way
claimed by prescription. In order to give title, such right must not only have
been enjoyed without interruption for twenty-one years, but that enjoyment must
have been adverse to the right of the owner of the land. When each of two
brothers, owning adjoining farms, permitted the other to pass over his fields as
a matter of mutual accommodation, and, after the title of one had passed to a
stranger, such travel was continued for more than twenty-one years, but in the
same spirit of accommodation, the user by neither party was adverse to the other,
and no easement was acquired thereby.
It would seem therefore fairly conclusive that satisfactory evidence produced
as to the relationship of the original grantors to the adjacent lands raises a presumption of permissive use and the burden of producing evidence as to hostile
interest by reason of subsequent transfers would fall upon the parties claiming
the same. Consequently, failure to come forward with evidence of such intervening hostile interest results in the presumption of permissive use continuing
through the years to the present litigating parties, and therefore confers the right
of discontinuance of the license upon the present servient tenement after giving
proper notice. McGuirk vs. Piecuch, 32 D. & C. 274.
However, the answer to the problem is not so readily conclusive as it appears.
Despite the presence of such relationship as will give rise to a presumption
of permissive use, is it not possible that a continuous use for a period of more
than twenty-one years will give rise to a presumption of a lost grant? In Garrett
vs. Jackson, 20 Pa. 331, the Court held that continuous enjoyment of an alleged
easement for over twenty-one years without evidence to explain how it began is
presumed to be in pursuance of a full and unqualified grant, and that in such
case the owner of the servient tenement has the burden of proving that the use
was not adverse but under license. It is to be noted, however, that the alleged
easement in this particularcase was apparent on the surface.
If we are to take the decision of the Court in the case of Garrett vs. Jackson,
supra, as conclusive, we are faced with the problem of making a decision as to
the effect upon the burden of proof between alleged easements which are apparent and those which are not apparent. In other words, there is presented the
conflict of two presumptions in absence of actual evidence as to how the use of
the servient tenement for the benefit of dominant tenement began. In recapitulation these presumptions are:
1. A rebuttable presumption of permissive use raised by reason of evidence
of relationship of the original grantors through whom the present litigants derived title, and
2. A rebuttable presumption of a lost grant raised by reason of evidence
of continuous use of more than twenty-one years.
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As to the former, the dominant party claiming adversely must come forward
with conclusive evidence of adverse use or the presumption stands. As to the
latter, the servient party must bring forward evidence of permissive use to rebut
the presumption of the lost grant.
If neither of the parties in the case herein being reported can bring forth
such actual evidence, there arises an apparent stalemate, unless one of the presumptions should be found to be too all-conclusive.
It has already been established for many years that one of the essentials of
adverse possession is that such possession must be open, notorious, and apparent. Restatement of Property, Vol. 5, Sec. 458, supra. It would appear therefore that a lost grant may not be presumed even though the usd be continuous for
more than twenty-one years, unless such use be apparent. The query is - may
a concealed use unknown to the servient tenement be considered adverse?
In Deeb vs. Ferris, supra, Judge Baldridge in stating the rule of Garrett vs.
Jackson, supra, expressly qualified the words "easement" with the words "which
is apparent." In the preceding sentence he states, "the situation would be quite
different if the pipes had been underground or concealed in the walls of the
building."
Under the authority of this decision the holding of the Court in Garrett vs.
Jackson, supra, must be qualified as applicable only to a factual situation in which
the easement is open and notorious. The presumption of a lost grant when the
alleged easement is concealed may not therefore arise.
Judge Wright thus resolved his decision in the case herein reported stating
as follows:

"Secret incumbrances in servitude should not be encouraged by the law. If
adjoining property owners agree that one may use the land of another in a nonapparent manner, the Court should not hesitate to require that such agreements
should be reduced to writing and recorded, or that some notice thereof be given
to subsequent owners of the servient tenement ..... Since the sewer line in
question was not an apparent easement, we find that no presumption arises that
its use was adverse. The burden of proof of adverse use therefore falls on the
owner of the dominent tenement."
In conclusion, we believe that it may be logically deduced that:
1. One claiming an easement over the land of another must not only show
continuous use thereof for over twenty-one years, but must also show that such
use was adverse.
2. Where the alleged easement arose as a result of the relationship of adjoining parties, in absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption of permissive use arises.
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3. Where the alleged easement is apparent, continuous enjoyment thereof
for twenty-one years without evidence to explain how the use began, raises a
presumption that the use was adverse, but
(a)
such presumption will not arise when the alleged
easement is not apparent since a use cannot be adverse unless
it is open and notorious.
Consequently, it may be stated as a conclusion of law
that the burden of proof of maintaining adverse use rests upon
the party, so claiming when the alleged easement is nonapparent, of unknown origin and unknown to the servient
tenement though in continuous use for more than twenty-one
years.
STANLEY G. STROUP

SALES -

STATUTE OF FRAUDS -

PAROL EVIDENCE

The fourth section of the Uniform Sales Act as adopted in Pennsylvania
on May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, (69 P S 42); provides: " A contract to sell or a
sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of $500 or upwards shall
not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or
choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same;
or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment or unless
some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent in that behalf .......
The question has arisen as to whether or not this section permits the terms
of the contract to be shown by several writings whose relation to each other is
not disclosed by the writings themselves but which relation could be shown by
parol evidence. The latest Pennsylvania case which considers the problem is
Brister and Koester Lumber Corporation vs. American Lumber Corporation,
356 Pa. 33 (1947) 50 A. 2d 672. In this case the plaintiff was a wholesale
lumber house. The defendant was a retail lumber merchant interested in procuring lumber for a customer. Representatives of the three met in the office
of the plaintiff and reached an oral agreement of sale. Delivery of the lumber
was to be made one week after the oral agreement. Following the defendant's
refusal to accept the delivery as agreed upon, a series of letters were exchanged.
The plaintiff contends that these letters and the other documents taken together,
satisfy section four of the Sales Act although the signed writing does not incorporate the others by reference and there was no physical atiachment of the
writings. Justice Jones, in his opinion said, "The required memorandum for
such purposes need not be a single writing, entire within itself; it may consist
of several writings; and if they bear connecting reference one to the other or have
even an undisclosed but actual relation, which oral evidence may be used to show,
they may be sufficient when taken together to supply the statutes requirement
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for a writing." As authority, Justice Jones cites Manufacturers Light and Heat
Company vs. Lamp, 269 Pa. 517 (1921) 112 A. 679; Title Guaranty and Surety
Company vs. Lippencott, 252 Pa. 112 (1916) 97 A. 201. He also cites Lippencott vs. Stringer, 80 Pa. Super. 162 (1922), to uphold his view. In the latter
case there was an internal reference to the extrinsic paper in the signed writing.
Neither of the Supreme Court opinions cited by Justice Jones seems to sustain
his view. In the Manufacturers Light and Heat Company vs. Lamp case, cited
supra, the court said at page 520, "It is true that the statute may be satisfied where the memorandum is made up of several papers, which together will
furnish the essential terms; but the separate writings must bear internal reference
one to the other. .

.

. If oral evidence be required to supply ommissions, then

the whole is reduced to parol." The Title Guaranty and Surety Company vs. Lippencott case, supra, is not in point. In the latter case the defendant was a tax
collector and he executed his official bond to the Commonwealth on which the
plaintiff, Title Guaranty and Surety Company, became surety. The defendant,
on the same day, executed a counter bond which was to indemnify the plaintiff
for loss should the defendant default on the official bond. The counter bond
recited that the plaintiff was surety on a certain bond and it set forth the reason
for the counter bond. The defendant defaulted on the official bond and the
plaintiff was attempting to recover the loss incurred. In the trial court, the
plaintiff offered both bonds in evidence but they were refused on the objection
that they were not self-sustaining. The Supreme Court reversed, saying at page
116 that, "The writing here declared on . .

.

.contains apt, complete and usual

phraseology to obligate the parties sought to be charged; it is sealed and dated;
it names the principal as such, and sufficiently indicates the sureties and the
moving consideration .... It is true, the bond in question does not recite the year

of the taxes therein referred to, or the precise place where they were to be assessed and collected but all such particulars appear in the other instrument which
was executed the same day; therefore the substantial question is: Does the writing declared on contain a sufficient reference to the prior bond, within the requireme-ts of the statute, as construed by the authorities? As already indicated,
we are of the opinion that it does. .

.

.

."

The court held these facts to be

analagous to a situation in which a piece of realty is referred to by name in a
deed by way of description and parol evidence is permitted to show to which
piece of land the description refers. In the Title Guaranty and Surety Company
case, supra, parol evidence was necessary to identify the other bond, not to prove
that another bond existed.
Justice Sadler in the Manufacturers Light and Heat Company vs. Lamp case,
supra, also cites I Williston on Contracts, 1101. Professor Williston said, "A
memorandum need not be contained in one writing; any number may be taken
together to make out the necessary written expression of the terms of the bargain, provided there is sufficient connection made out between the papers without the iid of parol evidence further than to identify papers to which refer-
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ence is made. This connection may be made out either from physical attachment of the different papers at the time of the signature or by internal reference ...... In Stein vs. Camden Fibre Mills, Inc., 148 Pa. Super. 348, (1942)
25 A. 2d 741; the court said at page 352, "There must be no substantial
inconsistency between a signed document and another document incorporated in
it by reference." This indicates that the court feels that there must be some
written reference in one instrument connecting it with the other. In Vitro
Manufacturing Company vs. Standard Chemical Company, 291 Pa. 85 (1927),
the court said at page 95, "It is sufficient if the agreement is shown by separate
papers so long as those relied on are so connected by internal references as in
effect to make one document, evincing a common understanding by the parties
thereto." Also in accord are Llewellyn vr. The Sunnyside Coal Company, 242 Pa.
517 (1914); and Weisenberger et. al. vs. Huebner, 264 Pa. 316 (1919). So
the rule in Pennsylvania seems to be, Justice Jones' dictum to the contrary notwithstanding, that if a memorandum is composed of several writings, they must
be related to each other by either physical attachment or internal reference in
the signed writing and oral evidence will be permitted only to identify the extrinsic paper. In Peoples Trust Company vs. Consumers Ice and Coal Company,
283 Pa. 76 (1925) 128 A. 723; the court at page 82 said, "Parol evidence is
admissible to identify the writing spoken of in another writing and is also admissible to identify a draft referred to in a signed memorandum although the
draft itself was not signecJ." Although this view has been adhered to by a majority of jurisdictions, some legal authors maintain that it is waning. Some
courts have admitted parol evidence to connect the several documents, in spite
of the fact that the writings referred to in the signed writing were not described
beyond a reasonable doubt as to their identity. These courts hold that in some
cases it would be unreasonable to require an elaborate reference in the signed
writing to the other papers. If the merest reference is made in the signed paper,
parol evidence is allowed to connect the documents and it is labelled identification. In nearly all of the cases in which parol evidence has been admitted to
identify the extrinsic writings, there has been no real doubt as to the identity of
the papers. All that is necessary in disputes of this type is that the reference
must be adequate to prevent the substitution of another writing for the one
to which the signed writing refers.
In the Brister and Koester Lumber Corporation vs. American Lumber Corporation case cited supra, Justice Jones also said, "Whether the memo relied upon
is a single document or consists of several related or connected writings, the
complete terms of a valid contract must be ascertainable therefrom and there
must also be disclosed therein an intention on the part of the vendee to be bound
by the asserted contract." He cites as authority Franklin Sugar Refining Company vs. John, 279 Pa. 104 (1924) 123 A. 685. It is true that Justice Sadler in this
latter case said that the writing should disclose an intention to be bound. However, what he meant was that all of the papers which constituted the memor-

72
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andum of the contract of sale, when taken together, should contain all of the
essential terms necessary to form a complete and binding contract. He could
not have meant otherwise because prior to that statement he quoted with approval I Williston on Contracts 1114, which states, "As the purpose of the
statute is to require a formality of proof in order to make a contract enforceable,
not to impose a new rule of law as to what constitutes a valid conract, it is immaterial with what purpose or in what way, so long as it is signed, the requirement of the statute is fulfilled." He cited Upton Mill Company vs. Baldwin Flour
Mills, 179 N. W. 904 (1920); a Minnesota case, which said, "If the writer of
the letter after reciting the terms of the bargain goes on and repudiates it or
countermands an order he admits he gave and the terms of which are sufficiently
stated or referred to, such letter may be a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the
requirements of the statute." He also cited Wilson vs. Lewiston Mill Company,
150 N. Y. 314 (1896) 44 N. E. 959; which holds that the purpose of the
signed writing may be to disclaim responsibility rather than assume obligation.
In 85 A. L. R. 1215, it is stated, "It is not necessary, in order to comprise
a part of the memorandum, that the signed paper shall be executed for the purpose of making the contract binding or that it shall be intended as an affirmance
of the contract. It may be sufficient, although it purports to repudiate the contract, as by disclaiming liability or attempting to cancel or countermand it." The
most recent decision in Pennsylvania on this issue is N. V. Reinder's Olie en
Veevoederfabrieken vs. Imperial Products Company, Inc., 18 D. & C. 258 (1933),
which holds that the purpose of the statute of frauds is not to impose a new rule
of law in determining what is a valid contract but to require a formality of proof,
and so the memorandum need not be in the form of a contract and it is immaterial for what purpose it was written. This case cites as authority Franklin
Sugar Refining Company vs. John supra; Mason-Heflin Coal Company vs. Currie
270 Pa. 221 (1921); Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company vs. Allebach,
82 Pa. Super. 563 (1924); McGowan vs. Lustig-Burgerhoff Company, 3 Pa.
Super. 227 (1928). Other jurisdictions which concur in this view are: California, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma and South Carolina. This lower court case
also stands for the proposition that the law requires that the memorandum, whatever its form, shall do more than recognize that there is a contract. It must set
forth all of the essential terms of the contract leaving none to be proved by parol
and it cites: Franklin Sugar Refining Company vs. Howell, 274 Pa. 190 (1922);
Manufacturers Light and Heat Company vs. Lamp, supra; Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company vs. Allebach, supra. Here we may inquire what essential terms of a contract are to be included in a writing to constitute it a valid
memorandum. In Mason-Heflin Coal Company vs. Currie, supra, the court said,
"Any note or memorandum in writing indicative of the intent of the parties, and
being sufficiently precise to enable one to ascertain the terms of the contract, and
signed by the party to be charged is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute of frauds." It is not enough that the memorandum set forth that there
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is a contract, the memorandum must show of what the contract consists. The
memorandum need not contain more than the oral bargain itself. The time and
place and manner of delivery are not essential terms. A contract which does not
mention these conditions can be enforced. The Uniform Sales Act, supra, in
sections 42 and 43 makes provision for time, place, and manner of delivery if
they have not been agreed upon. Section 42 states that the time of delivery be
a reasonable time; the place of delivery is the seller's place of business if he has
one and if he has not then it is the seller's residence; the delivery must be made
at a reasonable hour. Willis vs. Ellis, 98 Miss. 197 (1911) 53 So. 498. If the
oral contract has not included these terms the law will supply them in order
to make the written memorandum complete. The law also permits parol evidence of trade usuage and custom to explain an ambiguous term or to supply an
essential term of the contract which has been omitted from the memorandum because of trade custom. Pennsylvania follows this rule, Franklin Sugar Refining
Company vs. Howell, supra, McKnight vs. Manufacturers National Gas Company,
146 Pa. 185 (1892) 23 At. 164. It must be remembered that the memorandum
must completely evidence the contract which the parties made. All of the terms
and conditions of the oral contract must be contained in the memorandum or it
does not comply with the statute. Parol evidence is admissible to show thatoan
essential term of the oral agreement is lacking in the memorandum. Thus parol
evidence plays two roles. It can be used to supplement the memorandum by
identifying subjects referred to in the memorandum or by explaining the terms
ii the light of trade usage, and it can be used to destroy the memorandum by
showing that an essential term has been omitted and since it is an essential term
and it can only be proved by parol the memo is partly in writing and partly in
parol and the whole memorandum is reduced to parol, Stein vs. Camden Fibre
Mills, supra, and ManufacturersHeat and Light Company vs. Lamp, supra. In the
Brister and Koester Lumber Corporation vs. American Lumber Corporation case,
cited supra, Justice Jones said that the writings relied upon by the appellant were
not complete because they did not state the time of shipment or the place of delivery. As pointed out in the above discussion these terms are not ordinarily essential terms. But in the instant case there had been an oral agreement setting a
certain time of delivery and no mention was made of this part of the agreement
in any portion of the writings. The court, therefore, decided this case well on the
facts presented since the writings offered did not include the whole of the contract and therefore, the statute was not complied with.
SARA DUFFy
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WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - ISSUE OF LIFE TENANT - ADOPTION
BY PERSONS UNRELATED TO TESTATRIX - GIFT TO A
CLASS - WORDS AND PHRASES - ISSUE.
Testatrix bequeathed a life estate to her brother and upon his death the remainder to his issue absolutely. The appellants, children of the deceased life
tenant contested appellee's right to share in the estate as a remainderman on the
grounds of his adoption by persons unrelated to the testatrix. The appellee, the
child of a deceased daughter of the deceased life tenant, had been adopted some
23 years prior to the execution of the will. Held: The appellee clearly fell
within the class of "issue" named in the will and was not barred from participation in the distribution of the gift by his adoption. Taylor Estate, 357 Pa. 120,
53 A. 2d 136 (1947).
A testatrix can dispose of her property in any way she sees fit provided she
does not violate public policy or some fixed provision of law. In re Edge's Estate,
339 Pa. 67, 14 A. 2d 293 (1940). Testatrix devised a gift to a class by description
and it follows that anyone answering to that description is entitled to share in
the distribution.
- If the appellee falls within the class described, he logically is entitled to
share with others of the class. That class is "issue". The word "issue" in a
will means the "heirs of the body" and in legal parlance "lineal descendents".
In re Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3 A. 2d 218 (1939). The appellee
falls squarely within the class for he is the lineal descendent of the deceased life
tenant and unless he is barred from that class by his adoption or by some statute,
he is entitled to share in the distribution. That an adopted child is the issue
of his natural parents only, was decided in Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 A.
319 (1925) in interpreting Section 15 of the Wills Act of June 17, 1917 P. L.
403 (20 P S 252). Neither the Adoption Act of April 4, 1925 P. L. 127 (1 P S
1-5) and amendments thereto nor Section 16 of the Wills Act, supra, (20 P S
227-8) are applicable to the facts of this case. Though Section 16 of the Intestate
Act of June 17, 1917 P. L. 429 (20 P S 101-2) is not applicable; when it is compared with Section 16 of the Wills Act, supra, it does indicate an intention of
the legislature to treat the adopted person as a member of the adopting family
only in cases of intestacy, for the Intestate Act supra, expressly excludes and
prevents the adopted person from taking by descent by or through his natural parents while there is no such exclusion in the Wills Act, supra.
In the absence of statute the Supreme Court was reluctant to hold otherwise
and their decision was based on sound reasoning. Any other holding would have
been derogatory of the Common Law and of the facts.
On the basis of this decision a devise or bequest to the issue of the adopting
parents would exclude the adopted person from sharing in the distribution of the
gift. The same results would follow in both instances where the adopted person
was deceased but left children surviving him.
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What effect will this decision have upon gifts to a class by description other
than "issue"? Will it be confined only to the narrow limits of lineal descendents?
It is believed that this holding will be followed in every case where the adopted
person can be identified as a member of the class designated by the description i.e.
if the adopted person falls within the class he will be able to share in the distribution.
How will the Intestate Act and the Wills Act of 1947 affect this decision?
Section 8 of the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, Act No. 37 (20 P S 1.8)
provides:
"For purposes of descent by, from and through an adopted person, he .03all be considered the issue of his adopting
parent or parents and not the issiue of his natural parents: Provided, that if a natural parent shall have married the adopting
parent, the adopted person for purposes of descent by, from
and through him shall also be considered the issue of such
natural parent."
Section 6 of the Wills Act of April 24, 1947, Act No. 38 (20 P S 180.6)
provides:
"In construing a will making a devise or bequest to a
person or persons described by relationship to the testator or
to another, any person adoptedbefore the death of the testator
shall be considered the child of his adopting parent or parenti
and not the child of his natural parents: Provided, that if a
natural parent shall have married the adopting parent before
the testator's death, the adopted person shall also be considered the child of such natural parent."
The present decision will stand as the law of Pennsylvania upon this particular point until after the effective date of these acts, January 1, 1948. It is
believed that this decision will then be reversed and the adopted person considered the child and issue of the adopting parent and not of the natural parent.
The new Wills Act expressly states that persons described by relations'hip shall
be considered the child of his adopting parent. And child means "of the blood"
unless a contrary intention is shown. Under this Act the word "issue", as used
in the principal case, describes the person by relationship to the testator and the
adopted person should be considered the issue of his adopting parents and thus
unable to qualify as a member of the class to which the bequest was made.
It apparently was the intention of the legislature to prevent adopted children
from sharing in the estates of their natural parents either as a member of a class
to *hom a gift was made and to which the adopted person logically belonged
or by way of descent. In effect these two sister acts will carve the adopted person
completely out of the natural parents' family tree and graft him upon the family
tree of the adopting parents.
KENNETH W. HESS
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JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS BUSINESS -

DOING

SERVICE OF PROCESS

In New vs. Robinson-Houchin Company, 357 Pa. 47 (1947), the plaintiff
instituted a suit in assumpsit in Philadelphia County to recover compensation alleged to be due by the defendant under a written agreement, dated May 26, 1943.
Defendant is an unregistered foreign corporation in the business of the manufacture and sale of optical lenses and machinery, with its home office in Columbus, Ohio. By terms of the agreement in controversy, plaintiff was employed
"in capacity of Assistant to General Manager, with direct responsibility for all
government contracts and procurement of vital materials used in production and
any other matters needing special attention under direction of the General Manager." When the agreement was executed, the defendant established an office
in Philadelphia, listed its telephone in the directory, and paid for all office equipment, rent and salary of the plaintiff's secretary, by checks drawn on. the Ohio
office. Plaintiff estimated and attended to delivery of machinery to the Frankford arsenal; he disposed of lenses from the Philadelphia office; his sales were
invoiced by this office directly to customers; he made all adjustments and collected overdue accounts, handled advertising, and filled rush orders from the stoik
in the Philadelphia office. In 1945, he was engaged in matters pertaining to
termination of war contracts and sales and promotion of peacetime articles not
yet manufactured. All such activities carried out through the Philadelphia office were continuous, systematic and habitual. Four days after service of process
upon defendant company, it advised plaintiff that as of December 31, 1945, his
commission credits would cease. The lower court held that the service of process
upon defendant was proper under the Act of 1851 P. L. 353 Sec. 6, because
activities previously mentioned constituted "doing business", as interpreted under
the Act of 1851. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision,
At common law, a corporation could be sued only in the territorial juris.
diction where it had its legal domicile. Park Bros. and Co. Ltd. vs. Oil City
Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453 (1902). As early as 1817, an act was passed in reference to suits against corporate bodies, but in Nash vs. Wardens and Vestrymen of Evangelical Lutheran Church, "1 Miles 78, it was doubted whether this
legislation contemplated suits against foreign corporations, so actually, one of the
earliest acts changing the common law rule was the Act of 1849 P. L. 216, This
was followcd by the Act of 1851, Section 6 of which states that "it shall and may
be lawful to institute and commence an action against foreign corporations in
any county where it shall transact business or have an agency." In 1911, an act
was passed which was not so forceful and stated that process against a foreign
corporation "may" be issued in any county in which such corporation shall have
its principal office, or any such county where the cause of action arose. Such
distinction was made by the court in Eline vs. Western Maryland Railway Co.,
253 Pa. 204 (1916), and the colnrt held that since the Act of 1851 had not been

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

repealed, and the Act of 1911 used the word "may" rather than "shall", service
of process was valid in a county in which the foreign corporation was doing
business.
Hagen Corporation vs. Empire Sheet and Tin Plate Company, 337 Pa. 232
(1940), decided that the mere solicitation of business did not constitute the having of an agency as set forth in the Act of 1851, in relation 'to service of process.
Here, process was served on a sales agent and would have been valid, but orders
solicited were so few, and the success so slight, that it did not constitute doing
business. Also, in this case the solicitations were discontinued before the service
of process. Another case, Holliday Adminx. vs. Pacific Allanter Steamship Co.,
354 Pa. 271 (1946), held as the previous case, that the acts were so slight that
they did not amount to doing business, and since the corporation was not registered in Pennsylvania, it was a question of fact whether the corporation had an
agency in Pennsylvania. This case also held that the sheriff's return was not
conclusive, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was a general agent
for the War Shipping Administration, since the activities were so slight and
since there were no contracts, ties or relations with the State of Pennsylvania, a
judgment in personam could not be binding.
In Mingus vs. Florence Mining & Milling Co., 302 Pa. 529 (1931), the facts
were similar to those in the principal case. The court held that the question of
whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the State of Pennsylvania
is one of fact, and depended on the circumstances of each case. The court cited
Shambe vs. Delaware Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240 (1927), pointing out that
care must be taken to distinguish between acts which are in aid of a main purpose, and those necessary to the corporate existence. Also, the court held that
doing business did not depend on single acts, but the effect of all the combined
acts which the foreign corporation may perform in the state.
Two recent federal cases, Frene vs. Louisville Cement Co., 134 Fed. 2nd 511
(1943), and InternationalShoe Co. vs. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), have
held that a foreign corporation may be deemed present in a state so as to make it
constitutionally liable to be served there when the activities of the corporation in
the state have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to
liability sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent
to accept service of process has been given, provided there is more than mere
solicitation, or isolated acts.
The general conclusions reached from the review of the preceding cases,
extending over a period of 30 years, indicate that the Pennsylvania courts are
still in accord with the holdings of the early cases in regard to service of process,
and factors and activities which constitute doing business within the state. As
pointed out in Shambe vs. Delaware and Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240 (1926),
the essential elements which constitute doing business as required by the law of
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Pennsylvania are the same as those necessary under the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. They are as follows- (1) The foreign corporation must
be present in the state (2) by an agent (3) duly authorized to represent it in
the state. (4) The business transacted therein must be by or through such agents,
(5)the business engaged in must be sufficient in quantity and quality and (6)
there must be a statute making such corporation amenable to suit.
A. G. BURDULIS

